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ADOLESCENT CONFIDENTIALITY AND
FAMILY PRIVACY
FERDINAND SCHOEMAN*
Egeus: Full of vexation come I with complaint
Against my child, my daughter Hermia.
Stand forth, Demetrius. My noble lord,
This man hath my consent to marry her.
Stand forth, Lysander. And, my gracious Duke,
This man has bewitched the bosom of my child [..1
With cunning has thou filched my daughter's heart,
Turned her obedience, which is due to me
To stubborn harshness. And, my gracious Duke,
Be it so she will not here before your Grace
Consent to marry with Demetrius,
I beg the ancient privilege of Athens,
As she is mine, I may dispose of herWhich shall be either to this gentleman
Or to her death, according to our law
Immediately provided in that case.
Theseus: What say you, Hermia? Be advised, fair maid,
To your father you as a god,
One that composed your beauties-yea, and one
To whom you are but as a form in wax
By him imprinted and within his power
To leave the figure or disfigure it.'
Philosophy too has its trends. These days it is derigueur to treat
recognition of rights as inimical to intimacy and community. Because rights emphasize boundaries of agents, it is contended, they
are suited to relate strangers, not friends. But isn't it a virtue of
* Professor of Philosophy, University of South Carolina. The author would like
to express appreciation to George Graham, Hugh LaFollette, William Winslade, Robert Gerstein, Hugh Wilder, Sara Schechter-Schoeman, Franklin Zimring, Eli Newberger, and Nancy McKormick for helpful comments and insights. This paper was
originally presented at a conference on Privacy and Confidentiality in the Medical
Context at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galviston. This conference was
made possible because of the generous support of the Sid Richardson Foundation.
Helpful comments were offered by all the participants at the conference for which the
author is especially grateful. This paper is forthcoming in George Graham and Hugh
LaFollette, PERSON TO PERSON (Temple University Press, 1988) and is appearing here

through the permission of the editors of that book.
1. W. SHAKESPEARE, MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM, act 1, sc. 1.
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friendship to honor the independence and separateness of the other
as well as to take an uncommon interest in seeing the other
respected? We regard it as worse to transgress the rights of a friend
than those of a stranger. Even though it is romantic to think about
love as something that removes all barriers and distinctions between
souls, people who do not respect the separateness of those they cherish are oppressive. The separateness of others is not something that
stands in the way of perfect friendship, but a fact of life that calls
into play particular virtues.' Love involves a commitment to recognizing and promoting the other's good. This good is in need of structure, and this structure is informed by our sense of the rights of
others. Intimacy will characteristically require adjustments in, not a
scrapping of, ordinary expectations and practices. In this paper I
will examine some conflicts that arise within the parent-child relationship, using these as a means of illustrating the interplay-even
the interdependence-of rights and intimacy.
We picture a decent parent as a person who feels connected
with her child. This sense of connectedness manifests itself potently
when the child faces a serious problem, like pregnancy or overbearing depression. The more critical the situation, the more the parent
both wants and feels entitled to reassurance that the ultimate authority for its resolution will rest with her, or minimally that she
should be advised and involved in its resolution. Several factors underlie this expectation: (1) Because parents are responsible for their
children's welfare, they must be afforded discretion as to what contributes to this end. (2) We recognize and respect parents' interests
and investments in creating an environment in which their personal
values structure their domestic relations.'
It is characteristic of adolescence that the more critical the situation, the more likely the child will experience the urgency for privacy, vis a vis her parents, in dealing with it. This attitude is likewise grounded in several commonsense considerations: (1)
Individuals within the family unit are more than sub-units of a family. They are persons in their own right, and as such have some
rights to act or seek counsel from sources they reasonably deem fitting. (2) Developmentally, exercises in autonomy are important
learning experiences contributing to the emergence of a responsible
and mature self. (3) Furthermore, parents frequently lack objectivity
in addressing their children's problems, and consequently are as
likely to intensify as defuse the problem.
2.

See Schoeman, Aristotle on the Good of Friendship,63 AUSTRALASIAN J. OF

PHILOSOPHY

3.

269 (1985).

See Pound, IndividualInterests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MIcH. L. REV.

177, 181 (1916).

19871

Adolescent Confidentiality and Family Privacy

Just as we appreciate that respect for families requires according them the right to realize their own ideals, so too respect for persons requires according members of the family a measure of freedom
from surveillance, interference, and control by other family members. If it is part of the parents' ideal to impart certain values to the
children and enforce these, and it invariably is, requirements of
family privacy and individual privacy collide.
An example of the type of conflict that can arise may help direct attention to the issue. Suppose that a thirteen year old girl has
become pregnant and has told her parents. She also informs them
that she wants to consult with a psychologist about her situation.
Her parents may find this route to problem resolution both corrupting and repugnant for any of a number of reasons and forbid
their daughter to consult with anyone but themselves and others
they specifically approve. The daughter intends to see the psychologist, despite her parents' disapproval. The parents, discovering this,
seek state support in enforcing their control over their daughter's
course of dealing with her pregnancy. The parents maintain that
they have a right to a certain kind of influence over their daughter
because she is a minor. Their daughter, in turn, maintains that she
has the right to consult with whomever she wants as part of her own
deliberative process, and consequently neither her parents nor any
state agency is entitled to limit her in this way.
These claims conflict. But more significant than conflicting
claims is the conflicting moral pictures the daughter's and the parents' claims represent. The parents see themselves as a part of a
family that should function according to their values. When it fails
to do so, at the parents' request, the state should step in to support
the parents without first making a judgment about the wisdom of
the parents' values. The state, by enforcing the parents' control, offers its endorsement to the family as an independent unit. To the
parents, this is what deference to parents and families requires. If
the state only guaranteed parental authority after investigating and
passing judgment on the wisdom of their practices, it would be the
state as a unit and its values, and that were being promoted by the
intervention. Furthermore, the parents regard emphasis on the individual rights of family members as inappropriate in a family context
where intimacy, interdependence and connectedness should be the
basis for resolving disagreements.
The daughter's claim might be seen as offering another interpretation of family integrity. It is by not intervening that the state
pays deference to the family as an autonomous and independent
unit. Additionally, the daughter regards her parents restrictions as a
failure to treat her as a person with a point of view and rights.
These competing ideals and interpretations of family integrity
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is the focus of this paper. I will argue that the parent's interpretation of family integrity, as just presented, is misguided but nevertheless revealing of something morally estimable about parent-child
relationships. In teasing this out, I will show that liberal principles
governing legitimation of authority are consistent with respect for
intimacy as exemplified in family relationships.
It will be useful to begin by developing some distinctions. We
can differentiate two kinds of rights claimed on behalf of families.
One of these, a family privacy rights, is a right to be free from surveillance and interference with the internal workings of a family.
The state or another agent may be motivated to interfere within the
family. Family privacy rights are claimed as a basis for preventing
this interference.
In contrast to the assertion of a family privacy right is the claim
a family member initiates to bring the state or some other extrafamilial unit in to manage an issue that the party believes threatens
the family order from within. This kind of claim is called a family
integrity claim. When it is specifically directed at maintaining parental authority over children this is called a parental-roleclaim. In
the illustration cited above, the parents' claim that the state should
help enforce their demand that.their daughter not consult with a
psychologist would qualify as a parental-role claim.
Distinguishable from these two types of family-rights claims is
the claim asserted by an individual within the family seeking extrafamilial assistance in protecting individual interests or rights. This
kind of claim is called an individual rights claim.
In our illustration, the daughter's claim that her parents should
not be afforded state help in enforcing their strictures on her, she
could be grounding her position on either an individual rights claim
or on a family privacy claim. She could be claiming that she, as an
individual, has a right to seek counselling or she could be claiming
that no one else has the right to intervene within her family to force
a resolution of the family's problems.
The discussion thus far points to two meanings that respect for
the privacy of institutions can take: active intervention and enforcement of internal rules of the institution on the one hand, and deference or even refusal to be an agent of intervention on the other.
Since families are extended both forms of respect from the state, the
kinds of privacy afforded families cannot be interpreted as resulting
merely from the autonomy of each individual. If the state only refused to intervene into family affairs so long as no members of the
family called for protection, that would be one matter. But the state
does not treat members of families as if they were just random
groupings of autonomous individuals without special responsibilities
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for and relationships to one another. The state precludes itself from
managing disagreements between family members that it allows itself between persons not related by family bonds. For instance civil
suits between family members are nearly impossible. There are diverse reasons for this policy, but one at least relates to a recognition
that for a family to fill the kind of role people expect of it, families
must not be accessible to or constantly judged in terms of the larger
social perspective. The rules within an intimate context must reflect
the personalities of the individuals involved and serve the particular
meanings that intimacy has for them. Their intimacy is for their
sake, and not for the purpose of promoting social goals a majority
can agree upon. This means that outsiders should be very hesitant
to assess right and wrong, permissible and impermissible for the
parties intimately situated. This hesitancy is reflected in higher
thresholds required for intervention. This threshold accounts for
why the law is slow to intervene: it treats errors of unwarranted intervention as more detrimental than errors of non-intervention
when intervention would have been helpful. It is thought that unwarranted intervention precludes the kinds of intimacy, meaning,
and mutual accommodation that characteristically evolves in family
life. This threshold also makes it rather easy for intimate contexts to
be abused and become oppressive. Whether it will in fact be abused
is dependent in part on what rights-more specifically on what kind
of rights-members of a family regard themselves as entitled to.
Since I want to focus on privacy claims that adolescents can
make against their families, and the correlated confidentiality claims
they can make in communicating with and seeking services from
outsiders, it is important to analyze the different grounds there are
for permitting and recognizing parental control over children. Two
come readily to mind-one is the position that the child is protected
from the harmful consequences of his own immaturity by being put
under the authority of a caring, mature parent. If we differentiate a
child's rights to welfare from a child's autonomy rights, we could say
that in general, child's welfare rights are taken as more important to
promote than the child's autonomy rights. The other is the position
that it is the right of parents to create a home that reflects their
values and impart to their children the values that they deem
important.
These different rationales of parental authority imply distinct
sorts of discretion on the part of the parent. The rationale relating
to the child's welfare suggests that any rights the parent has to control her child stem from a trust or duty to use her authority to promote the child's well-being. In promoting this, the parent has at best
a kind of weak discretion-the discretion requisite to actually bring
about the conditions to assure some threshold level of well-being for
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the child. The rationale for parental control relating to the parents'
right to create a microenvironment that reflects and imparts their
values suggests something more positive and open-ended. Here the
discretion is strong in the sense that the particular guiding objective
is not defined for them. Their discretion is to be used to reflect what
they see as important, and not something that has been independently assigned to them to promote. Parents may not see themselves
as having strong discretion in so far as they think that the principles
they follow are not freely chosen. For instance, they may think that
God or custom or morality requires a particular direction. From the
state's perspective, however, these values are themselves discretionary since the state does not mandate what these principles are.
The issue of whether these rationales for authority and discretion-the child's welfare and the parents' ideals-can conflict is
often obscured because it is assumed that when parents limit their
children in ways directed to the fashioning of a certain character in
the child and a certain relationship between the parent and the
child, the parent naturally believes that doing this will promote the
child's welfare. Still, a distinction can be drawn between these two
rationales even in the eyes of the parent. When we consider our own
case, we recognize the difference between what is morally or religiously or legally required on the one hand, and what will benefit us
on the other. Why should we think that this contrast between welfare and relevant norms does not apply in cases where we take responsibility for another?
Furthermore, we recognize that besides promoting their children's welfare, parents can and do seek to promote certain cultural,
political, religious, or moral values that may contribute little to or
even diminish the child's welfare. For instance, suppose that a child
is born to a couple that is half Cherokee. The parents may realize
that by bringing up their child among the Cherokee, the child is
much less likely to flourish than if brought up in the culture of the
non-Cherokee parent. Still, we think it legitimate for parents to take
such risks for the sake of cultural preservation. The parents need
not think that Cherokee life is better than the alternative life for
them to be willing to take this risk. They may just think that if they
and others like them do not, a rich tradition will be lost to the
world. The parents may take cultural preservation as the dominating objective, not to be purchased at all costs, but something that
does have its risks. Promoting personal values and promoting a
child's welfare constitute distinct rationales that can recognizably
conflict in both principle and practice.
If one looks at the parental authority cases the United States
Supreme Court has decided, some generalizations can be drawn by
using the distinctions introduced above. When the Court upholds
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parental authority on the grounds of the parents' interest in family
life, it is in situations where the state, and not the child, is challenging parental discretion. Here the family is claiming family privacy
rights to preclude state involvement in an issue that does not stem
from domestic controversy. These are not contexts where children
are claiming rights on their own behalf not to be subject to parental
authority. The court rarely upholds state intervention to enforce parental control over children except when such intervention is
deemed requisite to protect the child's welfare. The rationale of parents having a right to structure a family as they see fit has never
provided a decisive reason for state support of parental authority
over an objecting child. This is to say that family integrity claims or
parental role claims are only enforced by the state when the rationale for according the parents discretion is the child's welfare. The
parent's interest in family life does not provide a legal basis here for
intervention to preserve parental role rights. Whatever enforceable
rights a parent has over her children are regarded by the state as
conditioned on the presumed objective of promoting the immature
child's welfare. Whatever enforceable discretion the state accords to
parents must be seen to be the weak discretion requisite to protect
the child's welfare, and not the strong discretion involved in creating a family according to one's own ideals. Creating a family according to one's own ideals, in so far as this is a matter of parental right,
is treated as a family privacy right, which is to say a liberty to structure family life with minimal state supervision.
This in itself should seem quite surprising since we would think
that if a parent has a right to raise his child in a certain way and to
organize his household along certain lines of authority, that this
claim should have some weight against the child's wishes as well as
against the state's. The courts have been very hesitant to interfere
with family privacy rights, and only under certain narrow conditions
will intervene to support a family integrity claim. Family privacy
rights pit the family against the state. Family integrity rights pit the
parents against the children. The state is unlikely to enforce the
parents' conception of right order against the child just on the
ground that that is what having a family is all about. Parents are
afforded wide latitude to run their families as they see fit. This is
what is included under family privacy rights-that no one outside
the family may direct the inner-workings of a family. But that
amounts to a liberty, and not an enforceable right, when challenged
by a family member. Having such a liberty does not assure success
4
in the domestic setting, only deference by extra-familial bodies.
4. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, in THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW, 1979
(P. Kurland & G. Casper ed. 1979). The author puts forward a different interpretation of the Court's handling of parent/child disputes. Burt maintains that (the con-
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There are times when the state steps in to enforce parental authority over children, but characteristically these are cases where
the child is not merely disagreeing with his parents over life's priorities, but rather where the child has behaved illegally or otherwise
gotten himself into a lot of trouble by harming others or endangering himself, often as a result of special needs or disabilities. When
the courts or laws require children to involve parents in their affairs,
it is with the understanding that the parents are situated and motivated to provide for their welfare, and with the possibility of locating a substitute authority if the child can establish that it will not
be in her interest to involve her parents in a particular urgent matter." It is important to differentiate state intervention where the issue is the child's welfare from intervention into a family when the
issue is a parent's capacity to impose his conception of family integrity on the children. The Court will permit the former type of intervention, but not the latter.
Reiterating, the strong discretion to construct a family observant of the parent's values does not derive from the state. It receives
deference from the state, but no active support. Family privacy
rights attend it, but not family integrity claims or parental-role
rights. The weak discretion parents exercise over their children is
bolstered by state authority because it is designed to protect and
promote children's welfare. To assist parents in achieving this end,
the state does recognize parental-role claims. The virtues that are
involved in state regulation of families emerge in limiting its own
discretion with respect to families to those cases where some threshold of minimum welfare has not been met. The virtues of the family,
servative block on) the Court does not back parental control as such but only successful authoritarian exercises of parental control. Burt's account lacks the elegance of

the principles described here.
Burt's major thesis in this article is interesting. He argues that in a range of
cases, including some involving family law issues, the Supreme Court has circumvented the process by which communities redefine themselves by politically addressing issues that divide them. Burt argues that the Court should act more as guardians
of this community reforming process than as a body that imposes its own solutions on
the community. The Court is lured into this misconception of its role, according to
Burt, by its expectation that it can resolve disputes to the satisfaction of all the parties involved, once its deliberations are made public. Instead the Court should recognize that some conflicts are not resolvable within the terms by which people define
themselves. What is required for resolution in cases like this is an endogenous reconception, not a court engineered solution. Id.
Burt develops this position in the context of his discussion of Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584 (1979), in which the Supreme Court overturned a lower court opinion that
would have required, or given a child access to, a formal adversarial hearing to determine the propriety of institutionalization, even if his parents or legal guardian and
the professional institutional staff, after evaluation of the child, agreed upon the need
for such treatment.
5. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979).
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in contrast, are involved in much more robust and creative efforts at
making a life and finding meaning together in accord with values
regarded as worth pursuing.
To say that family integrity rights and parental-role rights do
not derive from state authority is not to say that the values embodied in these claims are not important. Arguably they are the most
important things in the lives of the members of the family, and
surely it is largely the idiosyncratic values that emerge from the particular personalities that makes family life intimate and meaningful
for its members. Nevertheless, they are not within the competence
of the liberal state to actively promote. Think of the analogy with
religion. The state can regard religion as of supreme importance to
its citizens and even as essential to the social bonds that make civilized life possible, and yet regard itself as not competent to actively
promote the legitimate claims people make on its behalf.
It is noteworhty that the state has been hesitant, at times
shockingly so, to present itself as an instrument by which children
can assert independence from their parents. So, though the state is
hesitant to enforce parental authority for the parent's benefit, it
does preclude itself from being used as an instrument that would or
could undermine this authority. As a matter of state policy, children
are precluded from suing their parents for many kinds of acts that
would be tortious or criminal when performed on someone outside
the family. In the case of Roller v. Roller," a girl was prevented from
recovering for damages caused by her father raping her on the
grounds that permitting such a recovery would violate intrafamily
harmony in this and other cases. Furthermore, if a child tried to
assert certain constitutional rights of privacy against his parents,
such as the right to have personal effects like diaries or letters or
purses unexamined except when search was reasonable under the
circumstances, there is every reason to think that the court would
turn a deaf ear toward such a claim. The greater the special relationship there is between an authority and a child, the greater the
discretion there is as to what counts as reasonable.7
We can further refine our understanding of parent-child relationships, vis a vis the state, by considering issues that arise in the
area of confidential medical treatment. In obtaining medical services, the state generally requires that parents approve of any medical services provided. Is this consistent with the analysis offered?
Isn't it forcing the authority of parents on their children, rather
than just leaving parents free to exercise whatever authority they
can, provided that the consequences of this hands off policy do not
6. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
7. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
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threaten the child's basic welfare? I think not, because generally
matters of medicine are judged to relate critically to the maintenance of a threshold level of welfare.'
The decision with respect to medical treatment is conceived
very differently than is the decision with respect to something like
religion. The parents have family privacy rights with respect to religion, not because they are thought to be in the best position to
choose a religion helpful to their children but because we think that
no one else is entitled to intrude into the family's religious practices.
The issue of the child's achieving or falling below the threshold welfare level exclusively because of religious training or practices never
arises as far as the state is concerned. It is not that the state gives
parents rights to indoctrinate their children religiously. Here it is
just a matter of there being only limited state authority to interfere
with what parents are inclined very strongly to do on their own. But
in the case of medical treatment, the state invests parents with authority, that is, it requires that parents approve of medical procedures, because this is regarded as centrally connected with maintaining the child's welfare above the threshold. Here the parent's
authority stems from the duty to protect her children.
The parent's authority with respect to his child's cultural, religious, political and moral training is really the fallout of everyone
else's no-right to interfere, of the family privacy right. In contrast, a
parent's rights with respect to medical treatment derives not directly from a family privacy claim but from the parent's duty to assure her child's minimal welfare. Here the state does exercise its authority to promote parental discretion as such, but with the
objective of facilitating the parent's carrying out her duties of promoting the child's welfare. The type of discretion parents have here
is weak discretion, meaning that the authority they have must be
used to promote a fixed end-the child's health. The parents have
no comparable duty when it comes to religious, political, or moral
training imparted in the home. Hence in these latter domains, par8. A minor is, in general, not capable of giving a valid consent to medical treatment. Several rationales are cited to support this rule. In one sense it is a means of
societal protection for minors who, as a group, are considered immature and unable
to make wise decisions. This view underlies the supposition that a minor cannot understand the nature or consequences of medical procedures. The parental consent
requirement, furthermore, protects children from adult providers who might otherwise take advantage of their immaturity. The requirement also provides financial protection to parents who, because they will be liable for medical costs, are given authority to control the decision to obtain care. Moreover, because parents are legally
responsible for support and maintenance of their children and legally entitled to their
children's services, it is argued that they should be able to control those factors which
may deprive them of such services for short or extended periods, or which may otherwise increase the cost of child rearing. J. WILSON, THE RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENTS IN THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 123 (1978).
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ents have strong discretion, but no claim on outside assistance to
help promote their private visions if their children prove resistant.
There are two special factors that complicate the situation I
have been considering, especially as it relates to adolescents and
medical decisions. The first issue is maturity. The second issue is
privacy. The easier issue to deal with is maturity. Though children
in general are not of mature capacities, adolescents are getting close
to having mature capacities for making decisions about themselves.
If they could be assumed to have mature capacities, then the state
could not intervene to enforce parental authority over them. But
mature capacities are at best developing during adolescence.
An aspect of the maturity factor that entangles the situation is
the recognition that we have no clear standard of how much maturity is adequate to make critical decisions. There are some studies
that suggest that children who are seriously ill have a more realistic
and mature understanding of their situation than do their parents.
In one study,9 it is reported that children dying of cancer are thrust
by their parents and their attending doctors into the role of pretending that they do not know about their prognosis and that hope
for recovery to normalcy is warranted. 10
The second and more complex factor relates to privacy. As people mature, their sense of themselves emerges, as do the number and
kinds of phenomena they may come to experience as intensely private and personal. These phenomena stimulate, call into question,
and reform what the person feels belongs to his innermost self. We
understand that even in the closest of relationships, there are matters that individuals both legitimately and rightly keep to themselves. The experiences that are highly emotionally charged as well
as those that confront individuals with new or unanticipated aspects
of themselves and the world are the raw materials out of which character and personal substance evolve. We think it important that we
refrain from meddling and especially from forcing an individual to
give an account, designed to satisfy others, of what is going on
within himself or herself when struggling to incorporate unsettling
aspects of life.
9.

M. BLUEBOND LANGER, THE PRIVATE WORLDS OF DYING CHILDREN (1979).

10. This is because the adults cannot bear facing the fact that no effective treatment is available. In a context where the children, even rather young ones, demonstrate more competence than their guardians, there would be some basis in the law
for treating the children as mature minors and affording them the autonomy and
privacy any competent but sick adult would be granted. We should recognize that
even in the case of an adult that is gravely ill, physicians presumably involve close
family members in questions about treatment recognizing not the temporary immaturity of the adult but the intimate bonds that are presumed to lie between persons
and their families. Involving parents in decisions relating to gravely sick children
then would not be unlike treatment of adults under similar circumstances.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 20:641

Adolescents experience many things intensely, and like the rest
of us, have to develop resources for coming to terms with emerging
parts of themselves. They come to realize the limitations of their
parents, the adult world in general and its sacred institutions, and
they discover themselves as having new emotional and sexual needs.
Taking responsibility for features of their own character, for restructuring their own selves requires some distancing from their parents
and authorities in general.1" Although one can incorporate values
without examining them, part of what it is to take responsibility for
oneself as a moral agent involves assessing one's values. What one is
and will become as a person is at stake. One reason a person may
not want certain others to be a central part of this process is that
their involvement may limit or distort the kinds of reorganizational
strategies and perspectives available. Others will generally have a
fixed and settled view of what one is, and of how one can or should
adapt. Since what is put into question involves those individuals
closest to one, these relationships are also open to reevaluation. This
process gets further entangled because this testing occurs in a context in which adolescents must maintain intimate and dependent
connections with their parents. Hence the feeling that the internal
drama must occur on an internal stage and not in the more public,
familial setting.
It is best not to think about the whole range of issues that arise
between adolescents and their parents as if there were a single standard case, from which we extrapolate to all cases. Appreciating this
may encourage us to consider two domains of medical decision-making in a special light. The two domains include the psychiatric and
the sexual. Both domains bring the child in special contrast to,
though not necessarily in conflict with, his parents. The child's emotional and sexual changes are part of the normal experiences
through which the child sees himself as developing in a way that is
only partially dependent upon his parents' relationship to him. Even
those ways in which the child's development is a function of his parents' influence, the direction of the influence may be unwelcome.
Before discussing what the law should be in cases involving adolescent confidentiality and requirements for parental involvement
and approval, we will explore how parental virtues are ideally articulated differently for different kinds of cases. In so far as we think
11.

According to Aristotle, as we get older, we confront greater difficulties in

being effective at changing our character.

ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS,

book III,

ch. 5 (T.K.K. Thompson trans. 1955). He said that both the disciplined and the selfindulgent person may not longer be able to restructure their ways of thinking and
acting, even though at an earlier stage in their lives they encountered real options.
The reason we can be held responsible for our behavior, even though we can no longer
change our habits, is that we were once positioned to change it, and can now be held
accountable for what we did then. Id.
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that parental authority is conditional on promoting the best interest
of the child, we would expect parents to treat adolescent children
differently from smaller children when it comes to medical procedures in general, especially when it comes to situations requiring
hard decisions. Analogously, if the child kept a diary that he assumed his parents did not read, we would think that a much
stronger reason would be required to invade the child's privacy by
reading the diary when he was older than when he was younger. In
part this is because smaller children require more direction than do
older children. But in large part it is also because of the different
vulnerabilities of older and younger children. Privacy matters more
to older children and is more central to their development and integrity than it is to younger children; consequently the intrusion
both is and is experienced as more violative of the older child than
by the younger child. This is not just because older children have
greater expectations of privacy than do younger children. It is because privacy plays a bigger role in their development than it does
in younger children's lives, and intrusions would have much greater
impact on parent-child relationships in the case of older children,
for reasons recited two paragraphs back. Older children have more
to contend with than do their younger counterparts: older children
have more factors to balance because they have greater responsibility for both personal and familial well-being. Privacy is a major
managing instrument in this close context. The required parental
virtue in this context would involve recognizing the difference between the privacy needs of their older and their younger children. A
recognition of this difference is expressed in a recent case involving
an immature child's right to have an abortion without notifying both
12
parents:
Second, a minor's desire to maintain a measure of privacy of information about her personal matters is an important indication of individuation, a principal developmental task of adolescence. Indeed, defendants' witness Dr. Vincent Rue testified that teenagers in the early
stage of adolescence are much more likely to discuss a pregnancy than
are teenagers in the mid-phase of adolescence who typically would desire more privacy, and teenagers in the later stages of adolescence who
would be the most private, and insist upon confidentiality. Adult
women, in Dr. Rue's view, would be most insistent upon maintaining
the confidentiality of their decision. Therefore, . . some relationship
does exist between the decision to abort in privacy and the capacity
for mature judgment concerning the wisdom of this decision.
We should observe that the privacy virtues now being discussed
take into account only the perspective of the parent-as-guardian-forthe-child, and do not fully include the perspective of the parent-as12.

Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 767 (D. Minn. 1986).
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I will return to

In most cases of medical decision-making, there would not be
serious potential for conflict between the child's conception of his
good and his parents' conception. Nor would most of these situations be ones in which we think that the child's personality or integrity as such is at issue. In the psychiatric and sexual domains, however, we presume that there will be divergence and conflict between
the child's and the parents' views. To observe this is not to say how
it is to be settled.
We expect good parents to treat the sexual and psychological
domains more cautiously than they would other dimensions of the
child's life. While adolescents are very vulnerable sexually and emotionally, it is not so clear that parents are equipped to help children
through what seems most traumatic here. What we would think of
as ideal parental virtue here, again assuming the stance of a guardian of the child's welfare, would be something like this: parents offer
their adolescent children whatever direct help they can, but, realizing their own limitations, also offer the child the option of dealing
directly with an expert whose job it would then be to take the
child's best interest into account. This expert then must also make
an assessment about the maturity of the child. If the child seems to
be above some threshold of maturity, then the child will be responsible for the ultimate decision. If the child is not deemed adequately
mature, the expert makes the decision with the child, but it is the
expert's decision that is decisive in cases of conflict, and the expert
informs the parent of the outcome, unless the expert thinks that informing the parent would be seriously detrimental to the child. At
least in the abstract, it would seem as if parental virtue included
making such an option available.
We now introduce the perspective of the expert the child goes
to for consultation or treatment. Since, in this ideal situation, the
parent, in one of her roles, seeks the promotion of the child's welfare, and since the parent herself regards the confidential care of her
child to be in the child's interest, the expert would not feel torn
between helping the child on the one hand and respecting parental
authority or control on the other. In acting for the child's benefit,
the expert is acting to promote one of the parent's interests too. But
what about interests of the parents independent of the welfare of
their children-their interests in structuring a home life according
to their own ideals? Does the expert's awareness that promoting the
child's welfare might conflict with parental ideals introduce a cause
for conflict in the expert's conception of his role? In aiding the child,
is the expert the parent's agent or the child's agent? Is the expert,
like the state, only entitled to help the parent carry out his role
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when doing so benefits the child? Or may the expert take a more
active interest in promoting other familial interests when these conflict with the child's benefit? While it is understandable why experts
will feel torn in cases where the familial interests and the child's
interests conflict, it is anything but clear how the expert can feel he
has authority to act on the basis of these other, conflicting
interests.13
The issue of confidentiality between an adolescent and his doctor when the adolescent does not want his parents to be involved
either as ultimate authority or as advisor does not fall within the
domain of a family privacy claim but rather a family integrity claim,
and we have said that the state only regards itself as competent to
intervene in this context when the child's welfare would otherwise
be seriously compromised for failure to heed parental demands. A
law structured along such lines would accord well with our antecedent notions of parental virtues as we just discussed them, and
would take into account the requisite social, psychological and moral
developmental factors.
What would this mean about the adolescent-doctor confidential
communication privilege vis a vis parents? It would first of all mean
differentiating intensely private patient-doctor relationships from
those that are not. Included in the category of the intensely private
is treatment for sexual and psychological matters. Second, it would
require differentiating those cases in which mature or nearly mature
children are involved in treatment, from cases in which clearly immature children are involved. Third, it would require differentiating
those cases in which parental involvement would itself cause serious
risks for the child from those where it would not. Fourth, it would
involve differentiating those cases where serious risks attended either the procedure or the lack of procedure from those where no
such risks are likely. Fifth, it would involve differentiating those
therapeutic relationships involving professions that have high professional standards from those involving professions that did not
have especially high standards.
13. Though generally children could not be thought to validly consent to something detrimental to themselves, I think that there should be recognized situations
where parents legitimately endanger one child's welfare for the sake of saving the life
of another child in the family. Here would be a case where the state would permit

harm to befall a child, where the harm is not necessarily outweighed by expected

benefits to him. The state would recognize an authority of parents over their children
that does not necessarily presume that this authority is exercised to protect or promote the welfare of the child. See generally Schoeman, Parental Discretion and
Children's Rights: Background and Implications for Medical Decision-making, 10 J.
MED. & PHILOSOPHY 312 (1985) (discussing cases of parental authority endangering
their child's welfare); Schoeman, Childhood Competence and Authority, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 267 (1983) (discussing courts' rationales in such cases).
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At one extreme, we have a situation with the following factors
present: the adolescent is mature; the issue is sexual or psychological; the situation, though weighty, is not life threatening or the emotional analogue of life threatening; parental involvement would be
harmful for the adolescent as the child and the physician see it; and
in the physician's judgment what she would be helping the child
with is something for which there would be a strong measure of social support." This would provide the best case for respecting adolescent-physician confidentiality, vis a vis the parents. As a matter
of law, I think it fair to say that receiving medical attention for this
kind of situation without the consent or knowledge of a parent
would be legal, and laws precluding this would be declared
unconstitutional.' 5
At the other extreme, we have a situation with these factors: the
adolescent is immature; the issue is not generally thought to be one
of intense privacy; even though the child may desire confidentiality,
parental involvement would be helpful for the child; the situation is
one of serious risk for the child; and what the child wants is something that in the physician's judgment is morally troublesome. This
would be the worst case for according adolescent-doctor confidentiality. Here, the physician would probably be guilty of malpractice
were she to provide services for the child without the consent of the
parents.
Suppose that a child is seeing a therapist or physician either
with parental knowledge of the visits but without awareness of the
specifics or without parental knowledge. Suppose further that the
professional has reason to fear that the child will seriously endanger
herself or commit suicide. Is it then appropriate to breach the privilege of confidential communication? Unless the professional knows
that parental involvement in the treatment would be detrimental,
the professional should seek parental involvement. If the professional has reasonable grounds for thinking that parental involvement in the treatment would be detrimental, the professional should
seek a court order to find some other adult or agency that can serve
as a guardian until the crisis is resolved.
Problems for legal and social policy can be easily listed. First of
all, how can the physician tell if the child is mature enough to make
an informed decision in the particular case at hand? Second, how
14. There being such a measure of support is compatible with there being a
strong measure of condemnation.
15. As recently expressed by Judge Alsop, "But even the State's interest in encouraging parental involvement in their minor children's decision to have an abortion
must give way to the constitutional right of a mature minor or an immature minor

whose best interests are contrary to parental involvement." Hodgson v. Minnesota,
648 F. Supp. 756, 772 (D. Minn. 1986).
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can the physician tell if parental involvement threatens the child's
well-bring? This problem would be aggravated when the scenario involves the child going to a clinic where neither the child nor the
parents are known and where the relationship cannot be assessed.
Third, would the potential for having a confidential relationship
outside the family encourage adolescents to invest less in trying to
gain the understanding of their parents and thus work toward weakened family ties? Other problems abound.
Two factors contribute to an obscure picture of the law relating
to adolescent-doctor confidentiality. One factor, emphasized by
Franklin Zimring 6 is that there can be reasons for recognizing rights
for children that have nothing to do with an assessment of their maturity or their place in the family. We might take the treatment for
drug addiction, venereal disease, and access to abortion and birth
control services as examples. Generally, children are accorded rights
to these services independent of their parent's awareness or consent.
Since a right to such services under conditions of confidentiality is
thought to be the best way to minimize the serious risks associated
with adolescent life, acknowledging these rights does not necessarily
reflect anything but a concession to practical urgency. This recognition should not be exploited to uncover the law's attitude toward a
child's legal status or children-parent relationships in general.
The other factor related to an obscure legal picture of adolescent-doctor confidentiality is the dearth of cases that have come
before courts and have generated rules. This state of affairs leads to
differing assessments of what the state of adolescent-doctor confidentiality actually is.
According to one treatise, the courts tend not to require parental consent or involvement in medical matters, leaving it up to families to fare as best they can without the involvement of the law. The
law neither requires the parent to consent to medical services the
child can obtain, nor does it prohibit the child from seeking aid on
his own. Furthermore, there is little or no differentiation between
physician-adult confidentiality privileges on the one hand and physician-adolescent confidentiality privileges on the other. This means
in effect that if a minor can find a physician or psychiatrist for consultation or treatment, the law will not generally require disclosure
to parents of the fact of interaction, let alone the details of the
17
treatment.
F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF THE ADOLESCENT 100 (1982).
This is the picture presented in Angela Holder's book, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 156, 241 (1977):
[T]he normal exceptions to confidentiality, contagious disease, and danger to
life that would apply to an adult patient would seem to apply equally to a
minor patient. On the other hand, it would be extremely difficult to argue that
16.
17.
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Another treatise expresses less confidence in ascribing to children, even ones in adolescence, the same legal rights that adults enjoy to independently seek and obtain medical services, and to confidentiality within the relationship, outside the areas of treatment for
venereal disease or drug addiction, and to obtain birth control or
abortion services. Despite recognition of major trends in the law and
in social thinking to make children more autonomous in obtaining
medical and psychological attention, the author emphasizes as fundamental to our understanding of this area of the law that children
are not competent to give valid consent to medical treatment.18 This
author catalogues and critically considers various strategies that
might be used to hold a physician liable for civil or criminal penalties resulting from treatment that has not been approved by a
parent.' 9
Despite this author's reluctance to pronounce the child's rights
here equal to those of an adult, he does end up dismissing each of
these bases as not being really very threatening, at least in the context of responsible psychiatric care of a child whose parents would
not consent to the treatment if apprised of it. And when assessing
the confidential communication privilege as it applies to adolescentdoctor relationships, he states: "Generally, a physician has an ethical duty to maintain the confidentiality of information obtained in
the course of his professional employment."20 He also states:
In 1828, New York passed the first physician-patient privileged com-

munication law, and since then over two-thirds of the states have en-

acted similar legislation. These statutes prohibit the physician from
disclosing information of a confidential nature acquired while attending a patient in a professional capacity . . .Most of these statutes

contain a common clause which prohibits the disclosure of communication which arises in the course of the professional relationship. If
the minor is formally seeking medical aid, he or she should be deemed
confidentiality does not exist in the case of a minor patient who has been accepted for treatment without parental consent to the same extent as would be
allowed to an adult patient. . . . Analogizing again to the law of medical treatment, there have not been any cases in recent years in which psychiatrist or
any other physician or surgeon has been liable for proper, nonnegligent treatment of a minor 15 years old or older without parental consent. In addition,
most states have passed minor treatment statutes that allow minors to consent
to medical treatment. No case law indicates whether this would include psychotherapy. However, in the absence of a specific restriction to the contrary in
any particular statute, it would seem that a psychiatrist who is a licensed physician would also be covered by the treatment statutes.
18.

J. WILSON, supra note 9.

19. Several theories of liability have been advanced for possible use against a
person who provides services to an adolescent without parental consent. Those theories include battery, failure to obtain informed consent, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional harm, child enticement, and contributing to the ungovernability
of a child. Id. at 130.
20. Id. at 258.
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to have established such a relationship.2'
This review of the law suggests that what we considered to be the
policy expressive of parental virtues as they relate to parent-adolescent relationship is in fact captured by legal policy.
According to Joan Lovett and Michael Wald: "Thirty states and
the District of Columbia have laws requiring that physicians give
confidential care when treating adolescents for certain conditions,
usually those related to contraception, abortion, venereal disease,
and drug abuse. However, other states require parental notification
before a minor can receive abortion or contraceptive services."" In
their interesting study of pediatricians' responses to cases in which
the issue of respecting confidentiality for adolescents seeking medical attention for sex-related or drug-related problems, Lovett and
Wald found that physicians "strongly support confidential care for
adolescents." Their abstract of their study summarizes their
findings:
We examined factors that determine whether pediatricians will grant
confidential care to adolescents. Through four vignettes, in which adolescents of different ages and maturity requested confidential care, we
assessed the willingness of physicians to give such care for four
problems: request for contraceptive, diagnosis of gonorrhea, intrauterine device found incidentally on x-ray study, and illicit drug use ....
Overall, physicians agreed to give confidentiality in cases involving
sexual activity. They supported confidential care for 87% of patients
requesting contraceptives, but for only 54% reporting illicit drug use.
The proportion of physicians supporting confidentiality increased
with age and maturity of the minors. Seventeen-year-old mature adolescents seeking contraceptives were given confidentiality by 97% of
physicians. Thus physician responses to vignettes indicated that they
strongly support confidential care for adolescents as represented in
the clinical vignettes."
Since children typically are not in a position to pay for medical
services out of their own resources, many adolescents would find it
difficult to secure the services of a doctor without their parents'
knowledge and consent. But again, this is the result of the law's restraint with respect to interfamilial conflict. The lack of assistance
for children who want certain medical services combined with confidentiality regarding their parents, reflects the attitude not that children have enforceable rights to these services, but instead the view
that no one else has the right to prevent children from obtaining
services; they are at liberty. This means that their parents are also
at liberty to try to maintain their authority over their children. In
21. Id.
22. Lovett & Wald, Physician Attitudes Toward Confidential Care for Adolescents, 106 J. PEDIATRIcs 517-21 (1985).
23. Id. at 517.
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effect, the situation for adolescents is not very different from the
situation for financially dependent spouses.
The foregoing analysis, it should be realized, accounts for only
one of the parental interests in childrearing-namely the parent's
interest in promoting the child's welfare. This is the only basis for
enforcing parental authority over the child that the state recognizes
in practice. Still, parents have other legitimate interests in their
children besides promoting their welfare. Although parents have no
enforceable rights to the satisfaction of these other interests, we can
appreciate how important these are to the self-conception of the
parents, and consequently how frustrated parents will feel if their
interest in their children living according to their (the parents')
standards is unrealized. To the extent that parents have privacy interests in their children being certain sorts of persons having certain
sorts of relationships to them, the liberal and legal standards will
seem wanting. These standards recognize only the welfare interest of
the child, and not the parental authority that involves the exercise
of strong discretion to create a home environment that meets the
parents' ideals. In the area where parents have strong discretion, the
rights involved are really liberties and as such are not enforceable
against their children. These privacy concerns are morally appreciable even though not legally cognizable. Such privacy concerns, included within what Robert Gerstein labels 'the right to a private
life,'24 must in general remain liberties, not enforceable rights
against others. Were it to be treated as an enforceable right that
could be used to require participation by others, one person's right
to a private life could be used to deprive another of similar privacy
interests.
Does the moral and legal picture presented here interfere with
or undermine the intimacy of parent-child relationships? I do not
think so. Indeed, the less the parent thinks that his children must
live their lives as she wants them to because of her enforceable
rights to their obedience, the more everyone will realize that what
motivates them to share life and values the way they do is their
caring for their lives together and their love for one another. If this
basis for sharing life is inadequate for some, one has to question
whether what is felt as missing is the concern for intimacy that occasioned the search in the first place. Recognition of the types of
rights one has, even in an intimate setting, helps reform abusive social practices that are perpetuated by misconstrued moral
assessments.

24. Gerstein, California'sConstitutionalRight to Privacy: The Development of
the Protection of Private Life, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385 (1982).

